Project Workshop Two: The Implications of Pathologizing Conspiracy Beliefs
The second workshop of the project was focused on the implications of Pathologizing conspiracy beliefs. It was held at the Piazza Feltrinelli in Gargnano (Italy), on 25th and 26th May 2023. It featured six talks from researchers in philosophy and psychology, as well as six commentators.
SPEAKERS
Aleksandra Cichocka (Psychologist, Kent)
M. R. X. Dentith (Philosopher, Beijing)
Daniel Jolley (Psychologist, Northumbria)
Juha Räikkä (Philosopher, Turku)
Melina Tsapos (Philosopher, Lund)
Jan Willelm Van Prooijen (Psychologist, Amsterdam)
COMMENTATORS
Clotilde Calabi (Philosopher, Milan)
Eric Devall (Philosopher, Waterloo)
Carolina Flores (Philosopher, UC Irvine)
Keith Harris (Philosopher, Bochum)
Paul Noordhof (Philosopher, York)
Judit Szalai (Philosopher, Eotvos Lorand)
Programme (provisional)
25th May
09:30 Juha Räikkä: 'Why a Pejorative Definition of "Conspiracy Theory" does not Pathologize Conspiracy Theorists'. (Respondent: Clotilde Calabi)
11:00 Coffee
11:30 Jan-Willem van Prooijen: 'Conspiracy Theories and Polarisation in the Time of COVID-19'. (Respondent: Eric Devall)
13:00 Lunch
15:15 M R. X. Dentith: 'Pathologising Belief in Conspiracy Theories in Philosophy'. (Respondent: Paul Noordhof)
16:45 Coffee
17:15 Aleksandra Cichocka: 'Why Do Narcissists Find Conspiracy Theories so Appealing?' (Respondent: Judit Szalai)
18:45 Close
26th May
08:30 Melina Tsapos: 'Dimensions of Conspiracy: Toward a Unifying Framework for Understanding Conspiracy Theory Belief'. (Respondent: Caroline Flores)
10:00 Coffee
10:20 Daniel Jolley: 'Conspiracy Theory Beliefs and Non-normative Political Action' (Respondent: Keith Harris)
11:50 Close
Abstracts
Aleksandra Cichocka: 'Why Do Narcissists Find Conspiracy Theories so Appealing?'
In this talk, I will explore the role of personality in predicting engagement with conspiracy theories. Specifically, I will focus on narcissism—a conviction about one’s superiority and entitlement to special treatment. I will discuss the role of narcissism in conspiracy beliefs as well as readiness to share conspiracy theories with others. In the first section, I review studies showing that narcissism is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. I will discuss these findings in the context of recent developments in the study of narcissism which suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. My colleagues and I argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. We consider the role of paranoia, gullibility, as well as the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. I will also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one’s social groups. In the second part of my talk, I will present new empirical studies examining if and why narcissism might also be associated with readiness to share conspiracy theories. Our studies focus especially on distinguishing motives to share conspiracy theories for gaining attention versus to express concern over others. I will conclude by discussing the societal implications these two lines of research might have, especially for understanding political leadership.
M R. X. Dentith: 'Pathologising Belief in Conspiracy Theories in Philosophy'
Looking at a number of recent attempts in the philosophical literature which paint belief in conspiracy theories as pathological, I argue that such pathologising projects are prone to failure. This is because such projects either rely on overly restrictive definitions of what counts as a "conspiracy theory" (i.e. they turn out to only be about a subset of such theories), or overly permissive definitions of what falls under the label "conspiracy theory" (i.e. the account ends up including a lot of beliefs we typically—and for good reason—tend not to consider pathological). I then argue that a further problem is that many of the recent pathologising projects tend to ignore or gloss over two decades of conceptual work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory, and—as a result—they tend to change the subject or topic of the debate rather than work with the emerging consensus of around a minimal, value-neutral, and non-pejorative definition of what counts as a "conspiracy theory".
Daniel Jolley: 'Conspiracy Theory Beliefs and Non-normative Political Action'
Conspiracy theory beliefs can motivate a range of problematic non-normative political actions – i.e., behaviours that violate social norms, including violence against others, illegal protests, blocking roads, or property damage. Indeed, many perpetrators' manifestos have referenced conspiracy theories in recent terrorist attacks. Several empirical findings have also provided supporting evidence. However, it is unclear whether markers of psychopathology connect the links between conspiracy beliefs and violent reactions and whether tools to treat pathological beliefs should be used to break the connection. In this talk, I will discuss my research showing how the links between conspiracy beliefs and violent reactions are linked by feelings of anger, which is more pronounced for those with higher levels of paranoia. However, I will also showcase how loneliness could contribute to conspiracy-evoked non-normative action. Other data has also uncovered that the links between intergroup conspiracy theories and violence towards Muslim immigrants are conditional on specific political ideologies (i.e., preference for upholding societal hierarchies). Based on my work that leans towards non-pathologizing, interventions to target conspiracy-inspired violence will be discussed.
Juha Räikkä: 'Why a Pejorative Definition of "Conspiracy Theory" does not Pathologize Conspiracy Theorists'
Some philosophers have argued for a while that social scientists tend to pathologize conspiracy theorists. Philosopher’s worry has been expressed in a number of papers, for instance in “Social Scientists and Pathologizing Conspiracy Theorizing” (2018) and in “Pathologizing Open Societies” (2017). It is not exactly clear why those philosophers think that social scientists tend to pathologize conspiracy theorists, but often conspiracy theory friendly philosophers point out that most social scientists accept a pejorative definition of the concept of “conspiracy theory”. Such definition reflects spoken language very well, but philosophers seem to say that a pejorative definition makes us to dismiss conspiracy theories out of hand; if conspiracy theories are considered implausible by definition, then the theories cannot get fair treatment and will be rejected for just being conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theorists are considered (pathologically) irrational. In this paper, I aim to argue that accepting a pejorative definition of “conspiracy theory” does not mean that one pathologizes conspiracy theorists, or anyone else. On the contrary, a pejorative definition is harmless and fair, and it allows for individual conspiracy theories to be investigated properly and in accordance with good research practices.
Melina Tsapos: 'Dimensions of Conspiracy: Toward a Unifying Framework for Understanding Conspiracy Theory Belief'
Understanding the cause and nature of conspiracy belief has become increasingly important. Researchers have argued that believing in conspiracy theories is dangerous and harmful, both for the individual and the community. In the philosophical debate, the divide is between the generalists, who argue that conspiracy theories are prima facie problematic, and the particularists, who argue that since conspiracies do occur, we ought to take conspiracy theories seriously. Much of the empirical research has focused on correlations between conspiracy belief and personality traits, such as narcissism, illusory pattern perception, and paranoia, in the spirit of a generalist account. However, there is also ample empirical evidence that conspiracy belief is widespread in the population at large, which would be surprising and in need of explanation if the generalists were correct. In sociology and political science studies have demonstrated the role of group motivation and social aspects of belief in conspiracies. There is currently lacking a unified account of what motivates conspiracy belief that can capture the different intuitions, if possible, in one framework. This is the lacuna I wish to fill by introducing a framework that incorporate the many dimensions of conspiracy theories. The framework identifies three motivating factors for endorsing a conspiracy theory: group cohesion, cognitive needs, and truth seeking. A fourth dimension is the isolation value, or the level of content-anomie that the conspiracy theory takes. Thus, the framework is able to capture more normal cognitive functions that drive conspiracy beliefs, such as adopting to the in-group’s beliefs and the quest for truth, but also the plausibly more abnormal ones. Conspiracy theories can be positioned in a three-dimensional space depending on the degree to which they exemplify each motivating factor and the extent they deviate from the norm. I suggest that the generalist and the particularist have focused on different parts of this common three-dimensional space. I also indicate a relatively small area where I believe pathological conspiracy belief is to be positioned. Ultimately, however, it is an empirical question what part of the space (pathological or otherwise) conspiracy theories occupy.
Jan-Willem van Prooijen: 'Conspiracy Theories and Polarisation in the Time of COVID-19'
The COVID-19 pandemic has inspired many conspiracy theories, such as that the coronavirus was developed by humans in the lab, that Covid-19 is caused by 5G radiation, and that governments have planned the pandemic. Across countries, large numbers of well-functioning citizens embraced such conspiracy theories, suggesting that pathology is not a requirement to believe in them. That does not mean that these conspiracy theories were harmless, however. Our findings suggest that detrimental health choices during the pandemic were due partly to conspiracy theories shaping them, and partly to conspiracy theories helping people justify them. Moreover, conspiracy beliefs were a significant factor in explaining polarization during the pandemic, both geopolitically (e.g., China and the US blaming each other for the pandemic), and between groups in society (e.g., vaccinated versus unvaccinated people). While COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs may not be pathological, they are in fact harmful for public health, and contribute to societal polarization.
The second workshop of the project was focused on the implications of Pathologizing conspiracy beliefs. It was held at the Piazza Feltrinelli in Gargnano (Italy), on 25th and 26th May 2023. It featured six talks from researchers in philosophy and psychology, as well as six commentators.
SPEAKERS
Aleksandra Cichocka (Psychologist, Kent)
M. R. X. Dentith (Philosopher, Beijing)
Daniel Jolley (Psychologist, Northumbria)
Juha Räikkä (Philosopher, Turku)
Melina Tsapos (Philosopher, Lund)
Jan Willelm Van Prooijen (Psychologist, Amsterdam)
COMMENTATORS
Clotilde Calabi (Philosopher, Milan)
Eric Devall (Philosopher, Waterloo)
Carolina Flores (Philosopher, UC Irvine)
Keith Harris (Philosopher, Bochum)
Paul Noordhof (Philosopher, York)
Judit Szalai (Philosopher, Eotvos Lorand)
Programme (provisional)
25th May
09:30 Juha Räikkä: 'Why a Pejorative Definition of "Conspiracy Theory" does not Pathologize Conspiracy Theorists'. (Respondent: Clotilde Calabi)
11:00 Coffee
11:30 Jan-Willem van Prooijen: 'Conspiracy Theories and Polarisation in the Time of COVID-19'. (Respondent: Eric Devall)
13:00 Lunch
15:15 M R. X. Dentith: 'Pathologising Belief in Conspiracy Theories in Philosophy'. (Respondent: Paul Noordhof)
16:45 Coffee
17:15 Aleksandra Cichocka: 'Why Do Narcissists Find Conspiracy Theories so Appealing?' (Respondent: Judit Szalai)
18:45 Close
26th May
08:30 Melina Tsapos: 'Dimensions of Conspiracy: Toward a Unifying Framework for Understanding Conspiracy Theory Belief'. (Respondent: Caroline Flores)
10:00 Coffee
10:20 Daniel Jolley: 'Conspiracy Theory Beliefs and Non-normative Political Action' (Respondent: Keith Harris)
11:50 Close
Abstracts
Aleksandra Cichocka: 'Why Do Narcissists Find Conspiracy Theories so Appealing?'
In this talk, I will explore the role of personality in predicting engagement with conspiracy theories. Specifically, I will focus on narcissism—a conviction about one’s superiority and entitlement to special treatment. I will discuss the role of narcissism in conspiracy beliefs as well as readiness to share conspiracy theories with others. In the first section, I review studies showing that narcissism is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. I will discuss these findings in the context of recent developments in the study of narcissism which suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. My colleagues and I argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. We consider the role of paranoia, gullibility, as well as the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. I will also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one’s social groups. In the second part of my talk, I will present new empirical studies examining if and why narcissism might also be associated with readiness to share conspiracy theories. Our studies focus especially on distinguishing motives to share conspiracy theories for gaining attention versus to express concern over others. I will conclude by discussing the societal implications these two lines of research might have, especially for understanding political leadership.
M R. X. Dentith: 'Pathologising Belief in Conspiracy Theories in Philosophy'
Looking at a number of recent attempts in the philosophical literature which paint belief in conspiracy theories as pathological, I argue that such pathologising projects are prone to failure. This is because such projects either rely on overly restrictive definitions of what counts as a "conspiracy theory" (i.e. they turn out to only be about a subset of such theories), or overly permissive definitions of what falls under the label "conspiracy theory" (i.e. the account ends up including a lot of beliefs we typically—and for good reason—tend not to consider pathological). I then argue that a further problem is that many of the recent pathologising projects tend to ignore or gloss over two decades of conceptual work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory, and—as a result—they tend to change the subject or topic of the debate rather than work with the emerging consensus of around a minimal, value-neutral, and non-pejorative definition of what counts as a "conspiracy theory".
Daniel Jolley: 'Conspiracy Theory Beliefs and Non-normative Political Action'
Conspiracy theory beliefs can motivate a range of problematic non-normative political actions – i.e., behaviours that violate social norms, including violence against others, illegal protests, blocking roads, or property damage. Indeed, many perpetrators' manifestos have referenced conspiracy theories in recent terrorist attacks. Several empirical findings have also provided supporting evidence. However, it is unclear whether markers of psychopathology connect the links between conspiracy beliefs and violent reactions and whether tools to treat pathological beliefs should be used to break the connection. In this talk, I will discuss my research showing how the links between conspiracy beliefs and violent reactions are linked by feelings of anger, which is more pronounced for those with higher levels of paranoia. However, I will also showcase how loneliness could contribute to conspiracy-evoked non-normative action. Other data has also uncovered that the links between intergroup conspiracy theories and violence towards Muslim immigrants are conditional on specific political ideologies (i.e., preference for upholding societal hierarchies). Based on my work that leans towards non-pathologizing, interventions to target conspiracy-inspired violence will be discussed.
Juha Räikkä: 'Why a Pejorative Definition of "Conspiracy Theory" does not Pathologize Conspiracy Theorists'
Some philosophers have argued for a while that social scientists tend to pathologize conspiracy theorists. Philosopher’s worry has been expressed in a number of papers, for instance in “Social Scientists and Pathologizing Conspiracy Theorizing” (2018) and in “Pathologizing Open Societies” (2017). It is not exactly clear why those philosophers think that social scientists tend to pathologize conspiracy theorists, but often conspiracy theory friendly philosophers point out that most social scientists accept a pejorative definition of the concept of “conspiracy theory”. Such definition reflects spoken language very well, but philosophers seem to say that a pejorative definition makes us to dismiss conspiracy theories out of hand; if conspiracy theories are considered implausible by definition, then the theories cannot get fair treatment and will be rejected for just being conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theorists are considered (pathologically) irrational. In this paper, I aim to argue that accepting a pejorative definition of “conspiracy theory” does not mean that one pathologizes conspiracy theorists, or anyone else. On the contrary, a pejorative definition is harmless and fair, and it allows for individual conspiracy theories to be investigated properly and in accordance with good research practices.
Melina Tsapos: 'Dimensions of Conspiracy: Toward a Unifying Framework for Understanding Conspiracy Theory Belief'
Understanding the cause and nature of conspiracy belief has become increasingly important. Researchers have argued that believing in conspiracy theories is dangerous and harmful, both for the individual and the community. In the philosophical debate, the divide is between the generalists, who argue that conspiracy theories are prima facie problematic, and the particularists, who argue that since conspiracies do occur, we ought to take conspiracy theories seriously. Much of the empirical research has focused on correlations between conspiracy belief and personality traits, such as narcissism, illusory pattern perception, and paranoia, in the spirit of a generalist account. However, there is also ample empirical evidence that conspiracy belief is widespread in the population at large, which would be surprising and in need of explanation if the generalists were correct. In sociology and political science studies have demonstrated the role of group motivation and social aspects of belief in conspiracies. There is currently lacking a unified account of what motivates conspiracy belief that can capture the different intuitions, if possible, in one framework. This is the lacuna I wish to fill by introducing a framework that incorporate the many dimensions of conspiracy theories. The framework identifies three motivating factors for endorsing a conspiracy theory: group cohesion, cognitive needs, and truth seeking. A fourth dimension is the isolation value, or the level of content-anomie that the conspiracy theory takes. Thus, the framework is able to capture more normal cognitive functions that drive conspiracy beliefs, such as adopting to the in-group’s beliefs and the quest for truth, but also the plausibly more abnormal ones. Conspiracy theories can be positioned in a three-dimensional space depending on the degree to which they exemplify each motivating factor and the extent they deviate from the norm. I suggest that the generalist and the particularist have focused on different parts of this common three-dimensional space. I also indicate a relatively small area where I believe pathological conspiracy belief is to be positioned. Ultimately, however, it is an empirical question what part of the space (pathological or otherwise) conspiracy theories occupy.
Jan-Willem van Prooijen: 'Conspiracy Theories and Polarisation in the Time of COVID-19'
The COVID-19 pandemic has inspired many conspiracy theories, such as that the coronavirus was developed by humans in the lab, that Covid-19 is caused by 5G radiation, and that governments have planned the pandemic. Across countries, large numbers of well-functioning citizens embraced such conspiracy theories, suggesting that pathology is not a requirement to believe in them. That does not mean that these conspiracy theories were harmless, however. Our findings suggest that detrimental health choices during the pandemic were due partly to conspiracy theories shaping them, and partly to conspiracy theories helping people justify them. Moreover, conspiracy beliefs were a significant factor in explaining polarization during the pandemic, both geopolitically (e.g., China and the US blaming each other for the pandemic), and between groups in society (e.g., vaccinated versus unvaccinated people). While COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs may not be pathological, they are in fact harmful for public health, and contribute to societal polarization.