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Ema Sullivan-Bissett (PI)
Anna Ichino (Co-I)
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Conspiratorial Ideation and Pathological Belief
An 18-month Project funded by the British Academy Follow us on twitter: @Cons_Path Project Summary Conspiracy theories explain certain events as the result of secret plots by powerful and malicious agents. Such explanations are typically at odds with the ‘official’ ones defended by relevant epistemic authorities. It has become commonplace to classify beliefs in conspiracy theories as pathological, and sometimes even to equate them to paranoid delusions. But is this classification warranted? Our project aims to establish whether and to what extent conspiracy beliefs can be considered as signs of mental illness, and what implications would follow from the pathologization of these beliefs for practical questions concerning the treatment of such beliefs and for theoretical questions concerning psychopathology itself. We envisage that an interdisciplinary critical investigation into conspiracy beliefs and their relationship to psychopathology would lead to a better understanding of both these beliefs and other strange beliefs as they occur in clinical populations, with important consequences for identifying effective prevention and intervention strategies. |
Our project will examine whether conspiracy beliefs are properly described as instances of pathology by situating the question alongside the context of clinical delusions. Delusions are usually taken to be paradigmatic cases of pathological belief. They occur in the clinical population, are taken to be highly resistant to counterevidence, and often impair functioning. Examples include the Capgras delusion (‘my partner has been replaced by an imposter’), the Cotard delusion (‘I am dead’), mirrored misidentification (‘the person in the mirror is not me’), as well as more general (often paranoid) sets of beliefs concerning the malicious intentions of other agents.
That we should understand conspiracy theories as pathological beliefs finds support in some studies that highlight a correlation between conspiratorial ideation and schizotypal traits, such as ideas of reference, ‘odd beliefs or magical thinking’, and negative affect (see e.g. Barron et al. 2014, Bowes et al. 2020). In addition, some shared surface features of conspiracy theories and delusions (such as bizarre contents, resistance to counterevidence) might be suggestive of a similar status with respect to pathology.
In spite of these similarities, however, there are also some clear differences between conspiracy beliefs and delusions. One difference is that delusions are typically idiosyncratic and deeply isolating (putting aside relatively rare cases of ‘folie à deux’), whilst conspiracy beliefs are a much more social phenomenon, shared by relatively large groups, and which can strengthen group belonging. Another difference is that delusions usually occur in the context of some kind of neurological or cognitive disorder or dysfunction. Monothematic delusions, which are circumscribed and appear in subjects with otherwise normal beliefs, are often associated with damage to the right lateral pre-frontal cortex, which has led some researchers to posit a deficit in belief evaluation capacities (see e.g. Coltheart 2005, cf. Sullivan-Bissett 2020, Noordhof and Sullivan-Bissett forthcoming). Polythematic delusions often occur in the context of schizophrenia, and are symptomatic of more generalized disordered cognition. So, where we find delusions, we find disorder or dysfunction under one description or another. Conspiracy beliefs do not typically appear against a backdrop of neurological or cognitive dysfunction. Rather, what is commonly emphasized are their socio-cultural correlates, linked to conditions of (actual or perceived) marginalization and vulnerability (Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999; Uscinski and Parent 2014; Douglas et al. 2019; Pierre 2020).
These differences between conspiracy beliefs and delusions may suggest that, notwithstanding similarities, the former are not instances of pathological belief after all. Overall, then, the question of whether conspiratorial ideation is pathological is a long way from settled; and so far there has been little effort to address it comprehensively. Indeed, the studies which highlight the connection between conspiracy beliefs and schizotypal or pathological traits are merely correlational, and as such cannot be understood as establishing any causal connection. And although some researchers have discussed the issue at some length (e.g. Brotherton 2015, Ch. 5; Pierre 2020), there has not been any systematic work on whether the attitudes arising from conspiratorial ideation are instances of pathology.
Main Objectives
The primary aim of our project is to investigate whether and to what extent conspiratorial ideation should be understood as pathological, and what theoretical and practical consequences follow from how we answer that question. We thus have two main research objectives::
Project Participants
Lisa Bortolotti (Philosopher, Birmingham)
Aleksandra Cichocka (Psychologist, Kent)
Matthew R. X. Dentith (Philosopher, Beijing)
Karen Douglas (Psychologist, Kent)
Daniel Jolley (Psychologist, Northumbria)
Stephan Lewandowsky (Psychologis, Bristol)
Kengo Miyazono (Philosopher, Hokkaido)
Joseph Pierre (Psychiatrist, UCLA)
Juha Raikka (Philosopher, Turku)
Jan Willelm Van Prooijen (Psychologist, Amsterdam)
That we should understand conspiracy theories as pathological beliefs finds support in some studies that highlight a correlation between conspiratorial ideation and schizotypal traits, such as ideas of reference, ‘odd beliefs or magical thinking’, and negative affect (see e.g. Barron et al. 2014, Bowes et al. 2020). In addition, some shared surface features of conspiracy theories and delusions (such as bizarre contents, resistance to counterevidence) might be suggestive of a similar status with respect to pathology.
In spite of these similarities, however, there are also some clear differences between conspiracy beliefs and delusions. One difference is that delusions are typically idiosyncratic and deeply isolating (putting aside relatively rare cases of ‘folie à deux’), whilst conspiracy beliefs are a much more social phenomenon, shared by relatively large groups, and which can strengthen group belonging. Another difference is that delusions usually occur in the context of some kind of neurological or cognitive disorder or dysfunction. Monothematic delusions, which are circumscribed and appear in subjects with otherwise normal beliefs, are often associated with damage to the right lateral pre-frontal cortex, which has led some researchers to posit a deficit in belief evaluation capacities (see e.g. Coltheart 2005, cf. Sullivan-Bissett 2020, Noordhof and Sullivan-Bissett forthcoming). Polythematic delusions often occur in the context of schizophrenia, and are symptomatic of more generalized disordered cognition. So, where we find delusions, we find disorder or dysfunction under one description or another. Conspiracy beliefs do not typically appear against a backdrop of neurological or cognitive dysfunction. Rather, what is commonly emphasized are their socio-cultural correlates, linked to conditions of (actual or perceived) marginalization and vulnerability (Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999; Uscinski and Parent 2014; Douglas et al. 2019; Pierre 2020).
These differences between conspiracy beliefs and delusions may suggest that, notwithstanding similarities, the former are not instances of pathological belief after all. Overall, then, the question of whether conspiratorial ideation is pathological is a long way from settled; and so far there has been little effort to address it comprehensively. Indeed, the studies which highlight the connection between conspiracy beliefs and schizotypal or pathological traits are merely correlational, and as such cannot be understood as establishing any causal connection. And although some researchers have discussed the issue at some length (e.g. Brotherton 2015, Ch. 5; Pierre 2020), there has not been any systematic work on whether the attitudes arising from conspiratorial ideation are instances of pathology.
Main Objectives
The primary aim of our project is to investigate whether and to what extent conspiratorial ideation should be understood as pathological, and what theoretical and practical consequences follow from how we answer that question. We thus have two main research objectives::
- To better understand the nature of conspiratorial ideation and its pathological status.
- To better understand the theoretical and practical implications of taxonomising conspiratorial ideation as pathological, or not.
Project Participants
Lisa Bortolotti (Philosopher, Birmingham)
Aleksandra Cichocka (Psychologist, Kent)
Matthew R. X. Dentith (Philosopher, Beijing)
Karen Douglas (Psychologist, Kent)
Daniel Jolley (Psychologist, Northumbria)
Stephan Lewandowsky (Psychologis, Bristol)
Kengo Miyazono (Philosopher, Hokkaido)
Joseph Pierre (Psychiatrist, UCLA)
Juha Raikka (Philosopher, Turku)
Jan Willelm Van Prooijen (Psychologist, Amsterdam)