Publications (by type)
See here for publications by topic
|
BOOKS
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Under contract with Oxford University Press. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Under contract with Routledge. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: Irrationality. Under contract with Cambridge University Press. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) 2017: Art and Belief. Oxford University Press. Reviews
ARTICLES Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Rush, Michael forthcoming: 'Unbiased Awarding of Art Prizes? It's Hard to Judge'. British Journal of Aesthetics. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Better to Return Whence We Came'. Journal of Value Inquiry. Vol. 56, pp. 85-100. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Debunking Doxastic Transparency'. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 5–24. Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2021: 'The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusions'. Synthese. Vol. 199, pp. 10277-10309. Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2021: 'Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance?' Synthese. Vol. 198, pp. 5437–54. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: 'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 679–704. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2020: 'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 177, pp. 1213–1227. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Biased by Our Imaginings'. Mind and Language. Vol. 34, pp. 627–47. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence from Experience'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 920–47. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?' Synthese. Vol. 195, no. 8, pp. 3453–76. Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'The Epistemic Innocence of Clinical Memory Distortions'. Mind and Language. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 263–79. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Aims and Exclusivity'. European Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 721–31. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity’. Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 94–110. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2017: 'Another Defence of Owens's Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims'. Logos and Episteme. Vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 147–53. Stoneham, Tom, and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Another Failed Refutation of Scepticism'. Teorema. Vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 19–30. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Malfunction Defended’. Synthese. Vol. 194, no. 7, pp. 2501–22. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence'. Consciousness and Cognition. Vol. 33, pp. 548–60. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2013: ‘A Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 163, no. 2, pp. 453–57. McGregor, Rafe and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2012: ‘Better No Longer to Be: The Harm of Continued Existence’. South African Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 55–68. CHAPTERS Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: ‘The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion’. In Henne, Paul and Murray, Sam (eds.) Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Implicit Bias and Processing'. In Thompson, Robert (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. Routledge. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: ‘We Are Like American Robins'. In Stapleford, Scott and McCain, Kevin (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge, pp. 94–110. Bortolotti, Lisa, Antrobus, Magdalena, and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: ‘The Epistemic Innocence of Optimistically Biased Beliefs’ In Balcerak Jackson, Brendan and Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena (eds.) Reasoning. Oxford University Press, pp. 232–47. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Bortolotti, Lisa 2017. 'Fictional Persuasion, Transparency, and the Aim of Belief'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press, pp. 153–73. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bortolotti, Lisa, Broome, Matthew and Mameli, Matteo 2017: ‘Moral and Legal Implications of the Continuity between Delusional and Non-delusional Beliefs’. In Keil, Geert (ed.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, pp. 191–210. Bortolotti, Lisa, Gunn, Rachel, and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2016: ‘What Makes a Belief Delusional?’ In Mac Carthy, Ita, Sellevold, Kirsti, and Smith, Olivia (eds.) Cognitive Confusions. Legenda, pp. 37–51. SHORTER PIECES Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Against a Second Factor'. Asian Journal of Philosophy, symposium on Kengo Miyazono's Delusions and Beliefs. Vol. 1, article no. 33. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Believing Badly Ain't So Bad'. Philosophical Psychology. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2077717. [Review essay on Neil Levy's Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People.] Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Review of David Benatar The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life's Biggest Questions'. American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 18, no. 7, pp. W4–W5. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: ‘Belief-like Biases and Concept Centrality'. Symposium on Guillermo Del Pinal and Shannon Spaulding’s 'Conceptual Centrality and Implicit Bias'. The Brains Blog. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Transparency Defended'. Symposium on Miriam McCormick's Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief. Syndicate Philosophy. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘The Role of Emotions and Values in Competence’. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 43, pp. 379–80. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Review of The Aim of Belief by Timothy Chan (ed.)'. Mind. Vol. 124, no. 496, pp. 1258–64. Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2014: ‘Review of New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure by Nikolaj Nottelmann’. Dialectica. Vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 141–6. Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2012: ‘Changing Approaches to Blindsight: Relevant, but not Decisive: Reply to Foley’. Philosophical Writings; Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual British Postgraduate Philosophy Conference. pp. 56–60. |
|
