Project Talks
'The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion’ (Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Delusion Formation Workshop
Birmingham, July 2021 [online]
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
ESPP 2021
University of Leipzig, 30th August-2nd September 2021 [online]
‘Explaining Possible and Impossible Imaginings of Pain’ (Paul Noordhof)
Staff Work in Progress Seminar
University of York, 21st May 2021.
'Delusion and Function' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Oxford Epistemology Seminar
10th May 2022
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience' (Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Workshop on Delusional Experience
15th-16th June 2022
'It's Normal to Be Delusional' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Question, Explore, Discover Festival
Manchester, 28th-30th October 2022
'Conspiracy Beliefs, Monothematic Delusions, and Psychopathology' (Anna Ichino and Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Are Conspiratorial Beliefs Pathological? workshop
University of Birmingham, 24th-25th April 2023
'Is it Normal to Be Delusional?' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Greenwich Sceptics in the Pub at The Fringe
Greenwich, 9th May 2023
‘How to Biologise Monothematic Delusion’ (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Summer School on Delusion, Illusion, Hallucination
Bonn's International Center for Philosophy, 31st July - 4th August 2023
'Is it Normal to Be Delusional?' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Edinburgh Sceptics in the Pub at The Fringe
Edinburgh, 14th August 2023
'Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief’ (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Cognitive Diversity Seminar
National Autonomous University of Mexico, 27th November 2023
'Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief’ (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Philosophy Visiting Speakers Research Seminar
University of Southampton, 28th November 2023
'Norms, Functions, and Belief' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
CUSO Workshop on Normativity and Reasons
Puidoux, Switzerland, 28th-31st January 2024
'Monothematic Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Empirical Epistemology Workshop
University of Stirling, 23rd-24th April 2024
Project Outputs
Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2021: 'The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusions'. Synthese. Vol. 199, pp. 10277-10309
Noordhof, Paul 2021: ‘Explaining Impossible and Possible Imaginings of Pain’. Revista de Filosofía y Psicología. Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 173–82.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Against a Second Factor'. Asian Journal of Philosophy, symposium on Kengo Miyazono's Delusions and Beliefs. Vol. 1, article no. 33.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Better to Return Whence We Came'. Journal of Value Inquiry. Vol. 56, pp. 85-100.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Believing Badly Ain't So Bad'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 1208-1216.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Debunking Doxastic Transparency'. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 5–24.
Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2023: ‘The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion’. In Henne, Paul and Murray, Sam (eds.) Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury, pp. 87–111.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2023: 'Virtually Imagining Our Biases'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 860-93.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Rush, Michael 2023: 'Unbiased Awarding of Art Prizes? It's Hard to Judge'. British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 157-79.
Noordhof, Paul 2024: 'Irrationality and the Failures of Consciousness'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed.) Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 266-304.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed) 2024: Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2024: 'Revisiting Maher’s One-factor Theory of Delusion, Again'. Neuroethics. Vol. 17, no. 17, pp. 1–8.
Noordhof, Paul 2024: 'Delusion and Doxasticism'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 292-307.
Noordhof, Paul 2024: 'Delusion and Non-doxasticism'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 308-323.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2024: 'The One-factor Theory'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 414-429.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed) 2024: The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Oxon: Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Delusion'. Open Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science (MIT)
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Evolutionary Pressures on Belief Capacities'. In Lombrozo, Tania and Van Leeuwen, Neil (eds.) Oxford Handbook on the Cognitive Science of Belief.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Functions in Epistemology'. In Brzović, Zdenka, Garson, Justin, and Šustar, Predrag (eds.) The Philosophy of Biological Functions. Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'In Defence of Ontic Austerity for Belief'. In Schwitzgebel, Eric and Jong, Jonathan (eds.) The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: Irrationality. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Blog posts
In September 2021, the Imperfect Cognitions blog dedicated a week to the Project and published five posts:
1. Interview with Ema about the Project
2. Summary of Paul and Ema’s paper ‘The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusion’
3. Harriet Stuart's write up of our first Project Workshop
4. Summary of Paul’s paper ‘Radden on Imagining Pain and Delusional Affections’
5. Harriet Stuart's interview with Carolina Flores
Previous relevant work
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: ‘We Are Like American Robins'. In Stapleford, Scott and McCain, Kevin (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: 'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 679–704.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2020: 'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 177, pp. 1213–1227.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Biased by Our Imaginings'. Mind and Language. Vol. 34, pp. 627–47.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance?' Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02414-3
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence from Experience'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 920–47.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?' Synthese. Vol. 195, no. 8, pp. 3453–76.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'The Epistemic Innocence of Clinical Memory Distortions'. Mind and Language. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 263–79.
Noordhof, Paul 2018: 'Imaginative Content', Fabian Dorsch and Fiona Macpherson (eds), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 96-129.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) 2017: Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Aims and Exclusivity'. European Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 721–31.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity’. Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 94–110.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2017: 'Another Defence of Owens's Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims'. Logos and Episteme. Vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 147–53.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence'. Consciousness and Cognition. Vol. 33, pp. 548–60.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2013: ‘A Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 163, no. 2, pp. 453–57.
Noordhof, Paul 2009: ‘The Essential Instability of Self-Deception’, Social Theory and Practice, 2009, 35, no. 1, pp. 45-71.
Noordhof, Paul 2003: 'Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, no. 1, July 2003, pp. 75-100.
Noordhof, Paul 2002: 'Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences', Mind and Language, 17, no. 4, September 2002, pp. 426-455.
Noordhof, Paul 2001: 'Believe What You Want', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2001, 101, no. 3, pp. 247-265.
'The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion’ (Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Delusion Formation Workshop
Birmingham, July 2021 [online]
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
ESPP 2021
University of Leipzig, 30th August-2nd September 2021 [online]
‘Explaining Possible and Impossible Imaginings of Pain’ (Paul Noordhof)
Staff Work in Progress Seminar
University of York, 21st May 2021.
'Delusion and Function' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Oxford Epistemology Seminar
10th May 2022
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience' (Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Workshop on Delusional Experience
15th-16th June 2022
'It's Normal to Be Delusional' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Question, Explore, Discover Festival
Manchester, 28th-30th October 2022
'Conspiracy Beliefs, Monothematic Delusions, and Psychopathology' (Anna Ichino and Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Are Conspiratorial Beliefs Pathological? workshop
University of Birmingham, 24th-25th April 2023
'Is it Normal to Be Delusional?' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Greenwich Sceptics in the Pub at The Fringe
Greenwich, 9th May 2023
‘How to Biologise Monothematic Delusion’ (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Summer School on Delusion, Illusion, Hallucination
Bonn's International Center for Philosophy, 31st July - 4th August 2023
'Is it Normal to Be Delusional?' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Edinburgh Sceptics in the Pub at The Fringe
Edinburgh, 14th August 2023
'Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief’ (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Cognitive Diversity Seminar
National Autonomous University of Mexico, 27th November 2023
'Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief’ (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Philosophy Visiting Speakers Research Seminar
University of Southampton, 28th November 2023
'Norms, Functions, and Belief' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
CUSO Workshop on Normativity and Reasons
Puidoux, Switzerland, 28th-31st January 2024
'Monothematic Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Empirical Epistemology Workshop
University of Stirling, 23rd-24th April 2024
Project Outputs
Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2021: 'The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusions'. Synthese. Vol. 199, pp. 10277-10309
Noordhof, Paul 2021: ‘Explaining Impossible and Possible Imaginings of Pain’. Revista de Filosofía y Psicología. Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 173–82.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Against a Second Factor'. Asian Journal of Philosophy, symposium on Kengo Miyazono's Delusions and Beliefs. Vol. 1, article no. 33.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Better to Return Whence We Came'. Journal of Value Inquiry. Vol. 56, pp. 85-100.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Believing Badly Ain't So Bad'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 1208-1216.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Debunking Doxastic Transparency'. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 5–24.
Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2023: ‘The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion’. In Henne, Paul and Murray, Sam (eds.) Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury, pp. 87–111.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2023: 'Virtually Imagining Our Biases'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 860-93.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Rush, Michael 2023: 'Unbiased Awarding of Art Prizes? It's Hard to Judge'. British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 157-79.
Noordhof, Paul 2024: 'Irrationality and the Failures of Consciousness'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed.) Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 266-304.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed) 2024: Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2024: 'Revisiting Maher’s One-factor Theory of Delusion, Again'. Neuroethics. Vol. 17, no. 17, pp. 1–8.
Noordhof, Paul 2024: 'Delusion and Doxasticism'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 292-307.
Noordhof, Paul 2024: 'Delusion and Non-doxasticism'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 308-323.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2024: 'The One-factor Theory'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 414-429.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed) 2024: The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion. Oxon: Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Delusion'. Open Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science (MIT)
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Evolutionary Pressures on Belief Capacities'. In Lombrozo, Tania and Van Leeuwen, Neil (eds.) Oxford Handbook on the Cognitive Science of Belief.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Functions in Epistemology'. In Brzović, Zdenka, Garson, Justin, and Šustar, Predrag (eds.) The Philosophy of Biological Functions. Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'In Defence of Ontic Austerity for Belief'. In Schwitzgebel, Eric and Jong, Jonathan (eds.) The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: Irrationality. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Blog posts
In September 2021, the Imperfect Cognitions blog dedicated a week to the Project and published five posts:
1. Interview with Ema about the Project
2. Summary of Paul and Ema’s paper ‘The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusion’
3. Harriet Stuart's write up of our first Project Workshop
4. Summary of Paul’s paper ‘Radden on Imagining Pain and Delusional Affections’
5. Harriet Stuart's interview with Carolina Flores
Previous relevant work
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: ‘We Are Like American Robins'. In Stapleford, Scott and McCain, Kevin (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: 'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 679–704.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2020: 'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 177, pp. 1213–1227.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Biased by Our Imaginings'. Mind and Language. Vol. 34, pp. 627–47.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance?' Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02414-3
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence from Experience'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 920–47.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?' Synthese. Vol. 195, no. 8, pp. 3453–76.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'The Epistemic Innocence of Clinical Memory Distortions'. Mind and Language. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 263–79.
Noordhof, Paul 2018: 'Imaginative Content', Fabian Dorsch and Fiona Macpherson (eds), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 96-129.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) 2017: Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Aims and Exclusivity'. European Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 721–31.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity’. Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 94–110.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2017: 'Another Defence of Owens's Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims'. Logos and Episteme. Vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 147–53.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence'. Consciousness and Cognition. Vol. 33, pp. 548–60.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2013: ‘A Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 163, no. 2, pp. 453–57.
Noordhof, Paul 2009: ‘The Essential Instability of Self-Deception’, Social Theory and Practice, 2009, 35, no. 1, pp. 45-71.
Noordhof, Paul 2003: 'Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, no. 1, July 2003, pp. 75-100.
Noordhof, Paul 2002: 'Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences', Mind and Language, 17, no. 4, September 2002, pp. 426-455.
Noordhof, Paul 2001: 'Believe What You Want', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2001, 101, no. 3, pp. 247-265.