Project Workshop Three Conspiracies and Delusions The third and final workshop of the project will focus on conspiracy and delusional beliefs. It will take place on Monday 11th March at the University of Birmingham. Registration is free but places are limited. If you would like to attend please email me ([email protected]). We are hoping to facilitate attendance by Zoom for those who can't make it to Birmingham.
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Programme (provisional)
Monday 11th March 09:00 Registration/Coffee 09:30 Kathleen Murphy-Hollies: 'Are Conspiracy Theorists Confabulating?' 10:45 Coffee 11:15 Paul Noordhof: 'Sub-Category Generalism about Conspiracy Theories' 12:30 Lunch (at 13:00 we will play Fake Plots! A game about conspiracy theories, created by Lisa Bortolotti, Paolo Ceravolo, Anna Ichino, and Diego Tarantola). 13:45 Judit Szalai: 'Conspiracy Theorizing as an Everyday, Non-Pathological Phenomenon' 15:00 Coffee 15:30 Lisa Bortolotti: 'The Ant and the Grasshopper: In What Ways are Conspiracy Beliefs Like Delusions?' 16.45 Close
Abstracts
Kathleen Murphy-Hollies: 'Are Conspiracy Theorists Confabulating?' In this paper, I argue that conspiracy theorists, in making conspiracist claims, should be understood to be confabulating, and I outline the ways in which this is helpful and illuminating. I show how three features in particular of conspiracist claims are better understood when the agent behind them is understood to be confabulating. These are that conspiracist claims (i) are always ‘chopping and changing’, (ii) often draw on further conspiracy, and (iii) can even endorse contradictory positions. Understanding agents to be confabulating illuminates the everyday cognitive architecture and motivations which go into making and endorsing conspiracist claims.
Given the bizarreness of many conspiracist claims, the lack of evidence for them, and how irrational they can be, it is common to think that they signal pathology on the part of the agent. However, I argue that when conspiracist claims are understood as confabulations, we have an explanation for them which captures those features and yet doesn’t need to posit pathology despite, as I will explain, it still being possible for conspiracist claims to appear alongside pathology. They are not, however, indicators of it in the ways commonly thought.
Paul Noordhof: 'Sub-Category Generalism about Conspiracy Theories' In the paper, I argue for a kind of sub-category generalism about conspiracy theories. According to sub-category generalism: certain types of conspiracy theory have features such that it is prima facie, or default, wrong to believe any of that category. I identify four features possessed by these kind of conspiracy theories, explain why such an approach avoids the objections that have been made to generalism and identify two ways in which the approach may have interesting empirical implications, most immediately, for social scientists study of those who believe in conspiracy theories and, relatedly, for those doing research into monothematic delusion.
Judit Szalai: 'Conspiracy Theorizing as an Everyday, Non-Pathological Phenomenon' Conspiracy theories have been around for millenia, as part of popular thinking in different cultural environments and geographical areas. Intuitively, such beliefs are too widespread to be pathological by nature. Is it possible to explain conspiracy beliefs merely by reference to everyday, mundane cognitive tendencies, attitudes, or biases? The ambition of this paper is to substatiante the claim that ordinary, universal epistemic and affective orientations and propensities, sometimes in combination with certain informational and cultural-institutional environments, can account for garden-variety conspiracy theories, which share some fundamental mechanisms with self-deception, confabulation, and superstitious thinking. This doesn’t imply that no conspiracy theories involve delusions; the pathological character of those that do is explained by further factors, however. The motivational background, evidence (especially counterevidence) treatment, intentional content and affective commitment are demonstrated to come apart in everyday cases and in delusions. Apart from nondelusional and delusional conspiracy theories, ’grand’ and ’local’ kinds are also proposed to be distinguished.
Lisa Bortolotti: 'The Ant and the Grasshopper: In What Ways are Conspiracy Beliefs like Delusions?' In this paper I consider the cognitive antecedents of delusions and conspiracy beliefs. In particular, I ask whether we can (1) identify overlapping features between delusions and conspiracy beliefs; and (2) justify pathologizing such beliefs to the extent that we rule out the pursuit of common epistemic projects with people who endorse them. My answers are that (1) there is significant overlap between the biases and thinking styles associated with delusions and conspiracy beliefs; and that (2) pathologizing such beliefs cannot be justified based on their cognitive antecedents because the same biases and thinking styles that we find in delusions and conspiracy beliefs characterise human cognition and agency more generally.
