Talks
PAST
‘The Case of Self-Deception: Reviving the Teleologist’s Dilemma’
Postgraduate Philosophical Association of Southern Africa’s Annual Conference.
Rhodes University, 5th–6th April 2011.
‘You Cannot Weigh the Aim of Belief' (with Paul Noordhof)
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and The Mind Association.
University of Sussex, 8th–10th July 2011.
‘Changing Approaches to Blindsight: Relevant but Not Decisive’
(Response to ‘Blindsight Unbound: The Philosophical Relevance of Changing Approaches to Blindsight’)
Fifteenth Annual Conference of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association.
University of Reading, 22nd–25th September 2011.
‘Epistemic and Practical Reasons: A Lingering Conflict’
(Response to Daniel Whiting’s ‘Practical Reason, Practical Reasons, and the Aim of Belief’)
Workshop: Aims and Norms of Belief.
University of Southampton, 23rd September 2011.
‘Better No Longer to Be: The Harm of Continued Existence’ (with Rafe McGregor)
Workshop on Contemporary Anti-Natalism, featuring David Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been.
University of Johannesburg, 23rd–24th November 2011.
‘Do the Delusional Aim at the Truth?’
Open Minds VII.
University of Manchester, 26th June 2012.
‘No Truth Norm Needed: A Biological Approach to the Teleologist’s Dilemma’
Understanding Value.
University of Sheffield, 11th–13th July 2012.
‘Delusional Belief: Making Trouble for the Teleologist’
European Society of Philosophy and Psychology Annual Conference.
Senate House, University of London, 28th–31st August 2012.
‘Why It’s Contingent That You Can’t Believe at Will’
Sixteenth Annual Conference of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association.
University of Edinburgh, 3rd–6th September 2012.
‘Make-Believe and Belief Change’
(Response to Greg Currie and Anna Ichino’s ‘Make-Believe and Belief Change’)
Workshop on Perception, Memory, and Imagination.
Gargnano, 27th–29th September 2012.
‘Making Sense of Delusional Experience’ (with Paul Noordhof)
Workshop on Perception, Memory, and Imagination.
Gargnano, 15th–17th September 2013.
‘The Epistemic Innocence of Delusions and the One-Stage Account’
Edinburgh Epistemology Seminar.
University of Edinburgh, 29th January 2014.
‘Are Beliefs Based on Implicit Bias Against Women in Philosophy Epistemically Innocent?’
Feminism in/and Philosophy – SWIP Conference.
University of Oxford, 27th–29th March 2014.
‘The Possibility of Historical Malfunction’
Philosophy of Biology in the UK.
University of Cambridge, 31st March–1st April.
‘The Epistemic Status of Confabulatory Explanations’
The Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions.
University of Birmingham, 8th–9th May 2014.
‘Epistemic Innocence and Delusion Formation’
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association.
University of Cambridge, 11th–13th July 2014.
‘Response to Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen’'s "Epistemic Normativity: Absolute or Instrumental?"'
Epistemic and Practical Normativity: Explanatory Connections.
University of Southampton, 16th January 2015.
‘Delusion Formation: Lessons from Alien Abduction’
Royal Institute of Philosophy Seminar.
University of Nottingham, 4th February 2015.
'Aberrant Experience, Delusion Formation, and Alien Abduction Belief'
Aberrant Experiences and Belief
University of Birmingham, 16th–17th April 2015
'Being a Research Fellow'
Women in Philosophy: A Mentoring and Networking Workshop
University of York, 22nd-23rd June 2015.
'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction'
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and The Mind Association.
University of Warwick, 10th-12th July 2015.
'Alien Abduction Belief: Making Trouble for the Two-Factor Theory'
Staff Seminar Series
Monash University, 28th August 2015
'Why do Some People Believe Such Strange Things?'
Philosophy Society Lecture
Cheltenham Ladies' College, 29th September 2015
'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'
Transparency in Belief and Self-Knowledge
University of Oviedo, 9th-10th November 2015
'Implicit Biases and Propositional Imaginings'
The Nature of Implicit Attitudes
Essen, Germany. 16th January 2016
'The Biological Function of Epistemic Normativity'
Departmental Seminar Series
Open University. 3rd February 2016
'False but Useful Beliefs about Epistemic Normativity'
False but Useful Beliefs workshop
London. 4th-5th February 2016
'Delusional Experience and Relationalist Account of Perception'
Sensing Strange Things
University of St. Andrews. 4th-5th June 2016
'Implicit Biases as Unconscious Imaginings'
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and The Mind Association.
Cardiff University, 8th-10th July 2016.
‘Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?’
Early Career Mind Network
University of Cambridge, 4th-5th August 2016.
'Why do Some People Believe Such Strange Things?'
Philosophy of... Festival
Bedales School, 10th September 2016
'Delusional Experience and Relationalist Account of Perception'
(S)PIN workshop on hallucination
University of Durham, 14th September 2016
'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?’
Southern Normativity Group Annual Conference
University of Sussex, 21st September 2016.
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
Departmental Colloquium
University of Warwick, 1st March 2017.
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
Mind Network Meeting
University of Glasgow, 3rd March 2017.
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
Philosophy, Psychology, and Informatics Group
University of Edinburgh, 8th March 2017.
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
Implicit Bias and Metaphilosophy
University of Leuven, 29th May 2017.
'A Defence of Biological Answers to Philosophical Questions'
Emotion, Action, and Belief
University of Reading, 19th-20th June 2017.
'History, Malfunction, and Normal Conditions'
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and The Mind Association.
University of Edinburgh, 14th-16th July 2017.
'Belief, Truth, and Biological Function'
Law and the Whole Truth
University of Glasgow, 10th-11th August 2017.
'Etiology, Malfunction, and Normal Conditions'
Teleosemantics and the Nature of Function
Bielefeld University, 7th-8th September 2017
'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'
Epistemic Normativity Workshop
University of Luxembourg, 23rd-24th March 2018
'Imagining Our Biases'
Leeds Philosophy Seminar
University of Leeds, 3rd May 2018
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
How Implicit is Implicit Bias?
University of Antwerp, 31st May 2018
'Belief-like Biases and Concept Centrality'
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association.
University of Oxford, 6th-8th July 2018
'Epistemic Innocence and Delusion Formation'
European Society for Philosophy and Psychology annual conference
University of Rijeka, 10th-13th September 2018
'Norms, Functions, and Duties to Believe'
Epistemic Duties Workshop
University of Fredericton, 29th-31st May 2019
'Is the Human Predicament a Fate Worse than Death?'
Workshop on Benatar's Anti-Natalism
University of Liverpool, 21st November 2019
'We Are Like American Robins'
Epistemic Norms, Functions, Virtues
University of Glasgow, 4th-5th December 2019
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases' CANCELLED - COVID 19
Philosophy of Mind and Language Seminar
University of Milan, 20th April 2020
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases' CANCELLED - COVID 19
Philosophy Colloquium
University of York, 29th April 2020
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases'
Philosophy Research Seminar
Open University, 6th May 2020 [on Skype]
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases'
Philosophy Department Research Seminar
Queen's University Belfast, 11th November 2020 [online]
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases'
Philosophy Department Research Seminar
University of Durham, 3rd December 2020 [online]
'The Art of Implicit Bias Mitigation'
Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and Aesthetics workshop
University of Southampton, 25th January 2021 [online]
'The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion'
Delusion Formation Workshop
University of Birmingham, 12th-13th July 2021 [online]
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience'
ESPP 2021
University of Leipzig, 30th August-2nd September 2021 [online]
'Conspiratorial Ideation and Psychopathology' (with Anna Ichino)
Why Do People Believe Weird Things? seminar series
Bochum, 20th January 2022 [online]
'Conspiratorial Ideation and Psychopathology' (with Anna Ichino)
The 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory
Pitzer College, 5th-7th February 2022 [online]
'Delusion and Function' [Zoom]
Oxford Epistemology Seminar
10th May 2022
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience' (with Paul Noordhof)
Workshop on Delusional Experience
Birmingham, 15th-16th June 2022
'Conspiracy Belief, Monothematic Delusion, and Psychopathology' (with Anna Ichino)
Are Conspiracy Beliefs Pathological?
Birmingham, 24th-25th April 2023
'Is it Normal to Be Delusional?'
Greenwich Sceptics in the Pub at The Fringe
Greenwich, 9th May 2023
‘How to Biologise Monothematic Delusion’ (Keynote)
Summer School on Delusion, Illusion, Hallucination
Bonn's International Center for Philosophy, 31st July - 4th August 2023
'Is it Normal to Be Delusional?'
Edinburgh Sceptics in the Pub at The Fringe
Edinburgh, 14th August 2023
'Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief’
Cognitive Diversity Seminar
National Autonomous University of Mexico, 27th November 2023
'Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief’
Philosophy Visiting Speakers Research Seminar
University of Southampton, 28th November 2023
'Norms, Functions, and Belief' (Keynote)
CUSO Workshop on Normativity and Reasons
Puidoux, Switzerland, 28th-31st January 2024
'Monothematic Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief'
Empirical Epistemology Workshop
University of Stirling, 23rd-24th April 2024
‘The Case of Self-Deception: Reviving the Teleologist’s Dilemma’
Postgraduate Philosophical Association of Southern Africa’s Annual Conference.
Rhodes University, 5th–6th April 2011.
‘You Cannot Weigh the Aim of Belief' (with Paul Noordhof)
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and The Mind Association.
University of Sussex, 8th–10th July 2011.
‘Changing Approaches to Blindsight: Relevant but Not Decisive’
(Response to ‘Blindsight Unbound: The Philosophical Relevance of Changing Approaches to Blindsight’)
Fifteenth Annual Conference of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association.
University of Reading, 22nd–25th September 2011.
‘Epistemic and Practical Reasons: A Lingering Conflict’
(Response to Daniel Whiting’s ‘Practical Reason, Practical Reasons, and the Aim of Belief’)
Workshop: Aims and Norms of Belief.
University of Southampton, 23rd September 2011.
‘Better No Longer to Be: The Harm of Continued Existence’ (with Rafe McGregor)
Workshop on Contemporary Anti-Natalism, featuring David Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been.
University of Johannesburg, 23rd–24th November 2011.
‘Do the Delusional Aim at the Truth?’
Open Minds VII.
University of Manchester, 26th June 2012.
‘No Truth Norm Needed: A Biological Approach to the Teleologist’s Dilemma’
Understanding Value.
University of Sheffield, 11th–13th July 2012.
‘Delusional Belief: Making Trouble for the Teleologist’
European Society of Philosophy and Psychology Annual Conference.
Senate House, University of London, 28th–31st August 2012.
‘Why It’s Contingent That You Can’t Believe at Will’
Sixteenth Annual Conference of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association.
University of Edinburgh, 3rd–6th September 2012.
‘Make-Believe and Belief Change’
(Response to Greg Currie and Anna Ichino’s ‘Make-Believe and Belief Change’)
Workshop on Perception, Memory, and Imagination.
Gargnano, 27th–29th September 2012.
‘Making Sense of Delusional Experience’ (with Paul Noordhof)
Workshop on Perception, Memory, and Imagination.
Gargnano, 15th–17th September 2013.
‘The Epistemic Innocence of Delusions and the One-Stage Account’
Edinburgh Epistemology Seminar.
University of Edinburgh, 29th January 2014.
‘Are Beliefs Based on Implicit Bias Against Women in Philosophy Epistemically Innocent?’
Feminism in/and Philosophy – SWIP Conference.
University of Oxford, 27th–29th March 2014.
‘The Possibility of Historical Malfunction’
Philosophy of Biology in the UK.
University of Cambridge, 31st March–1st April.
‘The Epistemic Status of Confabulatory Explanations’
The Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions.
University of Birmingham, 8th–9th May 2014.
‘Epistemic Innocence and Delusion Formation’
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association.
University of Cambridge, 11th–13th July 2014.
‘Response to Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen’'s "Epistemic Normativity: Absolute or Instrumental?"'
Epistemic and Practical Normativity: Explanatory Connections.
University of Southampton, 16th January 2015.
‘Delusion Formation: Lessons from Alien Abduction’
Royal Institute of Philosophy Seminar.
University of Nottingham, 4th February 2015.
'Aberrant Experience, Delusion Formation, and Alien Abduction Belief'
Aberrant Experiences and Belief
University of Birmingham, 16th–17th April 2015
'Being a Research Fellow'
Women in Philosophy: A Mentoring and Networking Workshop
University of York, 22nd-23rd June 2015.
'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction'
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and The Mind Association.
University of Warwick, 10th-12th July 2015.
'Alien Abduction Belief: Making Trouble for the Two-Factor Theory'
Staff Seminar Series
Monash University, 28th August 2015
'Why do Some People Believe Such Strange Things?'
Philosophy Society Lecture
Cheltenham Ladies' College, 29th September 2015
'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'
Transparency in Belief and Self-Knowledge
University of Oviedo, 9th-10th November 2015
'Implicit Biases and Propositional Imaginings'
The Nature of Implicit Attitudes
Essen, Germany. 16th January 2016
'The Biological Function of Epistemic Normativity'
Departmental Seminar Series
Open University. 3rd February 2016
'False but Useful Beliefs about Epistemic Normativity'
False but Useful Beliefs workshop
London. 4th-5th February 2016
'Delusional Experience and Relationalist Account of Perception'
Sensing Strange Things
University of St. Andrews. 4th-5th June 2016
'Implicit Biases as Unconscious Imaginings'
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and The Mind Association.
Cardiff University, 8th-10th July 2016.
‘Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?’
Early Career Mind Network
University of Cambridge, 4th-5th August 2016.
'Why do Some People Believe Such Strange Things?'
Philosophy of... Festival
Bedales School, 10th September 2016
'Delusional Experience and Relationalist Account of Perception'
(S)PIN workshop on hallucination
University of Durham, 14th September 2016
'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?’
Southern Normativity Group Annual Conference
University of Sussex, 21st September 2016.
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
Departmental Colloquium
University of Warwick, 1st March 2017.
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
Mind Network Meeting
University of Glasgow, 3rd March 2017.
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
Philosophy, Psychology, and Informatics Group
University of Edinburgh, 8th March 2017.
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
Implicit Bias and Metaphilosophy
University of Leuven, 29th May 2017.
'A Defence of Biological Answers to Philosophical Questions'
Emotion, Action, and Belief
University of Reading, 19th-20th June 2017.
'History, Malfunction, and Normal Conditions'
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and The Mind Association.
University of Edinburgh, 14th-16th July 2017.
'Belief, Truth, and Biological Function'
Law and the Whole Truth
University of Glasgow, 10th-11th August 2017.
'Etiology, Malfunction, and Normal Conditions'
Teleosemantics and the Nature of Function
Bielefeld University, 7th-8th September 2017
'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'
Epistemic Normativity Workshop
University of Luxembourg, 23rd-24th March 2018
'Imagining Our Biases'
Leeds Philosophy Seminar
University of Leeds, 3rd May 2018
'Implicit Bias and Unconscious Imagination'
How Implicit is Implicit Bias?
University of Antwerp, 31st May 2018
'Belief-like Biases and Concept Centrality'
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association.
University of Oxford, 6th-8th July 2018
'Epistemic Innocence and Delusion Formation'
European Society for Philosophy and Psychology annual conference
University of Rijeka, 10th-13th September 2018
'Norms, Functions, and Duties to Believe'
Epistemic Duties Workshop
University of Fredericton, 29th-31st May 2019
'Is the Human Predicament a Fate Worse than Death?'
Workshop on Benatar's Anti-Natalism
University of Liverpool, 21st November 2019
'We Are Like American Robins'
Epistemic Norms, Functions, Virtues
University of Glasgow, 4th-5th December 2019
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases' CANCELLED - COVID 19
Philosophy of Mind and Language Seminar
University of Milan, 20th April 2020
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases' CANCELLED - COVID 19
Philosophy Colloquium
University of York, 29th April 2020
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases'
Philosophy Research Seminar
Open University, 6th May 2020 [on Skype]
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases'
Philosophy Department Research Seminar
Queen's University Belfast, 11th November 2020 [online]
'Virtually Imagining Our Biases'
Philosophy Department Research Seminar
University of Durham, 3rd December 2020 [online]
'The Art of Implicit Bias Mitigation'
Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and Aesthetics workshop
University of Southampton, 25th January 2021 [online]
'The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion'
Delusion Formation Workshop
University of Birmingham, 12th-13th July 2021 [online]
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience'
ESPP 2021
University of Leipzig, 30th August-2nd September 2021 [online]
'Conspiratorial Ideation and Psychopathology' (with Anna Ichino)
Why Do People Believe Weird Things? seminar series
Bochum, 20th January 2022 [online]
'Conspiratorial Ideation and Psychopathology' (with Anna Ichino)
The 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory
Pitzer College, 5th-7th February 2022 [online]
'Delusion and Function' [Zoom]
Oxford Epistemology Seminar
10th May 2022
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience' (with Paul Noordhof)
Workshop on Delusional Experience
Birmingham, 15th-16th June 2022
'Conspiracy Belief, Monothematic Delusion, and Psychopathology' (with Anna Ichino)
Are Conspiracy Beliefs Pathological?
Birmingham, 24th-25th April 2023
'Is it Normal to Be Delusional?'
Greenwich Sceptics in the Pub at The Fringe
Greenwich, 9th May 2023
‘How to Biologise Monothematic Delusion’ (Keynote)
Summer School on Delusion, Illusion, Hallucination
Bonn's International Center for Philosophy, 31st July - 4th August 2023
'Is it Normal to Be Delusional?'
Edinburgh Sceptics in the Pub at The Fringe
Edinburgh, 14th August 2023
'Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief’
Cognitive Diversity Seminar
National Autonomous University of Mexico, 27th November 2023
'Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief’
Philosophy Visiting Speakers Research Seminar
University of Southampton, 28th November 2023
'Norms, Functions, and Belief' (Keynote)
CUSO Workshop on Normativity and Reasons
Puidoux, Switzerland, 28th-31st January 2024
'Monothematic Delusions are Misfunctions of Belief'
Empirical Epistemology Workshop
University of Stirling, 23rd-24th April 2024