'Making Sense of Delusional Experience' (Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Workshop on Delusional Experience
15th-16th June 2022
'How to Biologize Monothematic Delusion' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Oxford Epistemology Seminar
10th May 2022
‘Explaining Possible and Impossible Imaginings of Pain’ (Paul Noordhof)
Staff Work in Progress Seminar
University of York, 21st May 2021.
'Making Sense of Delusional Experience' (Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
University of Leipzig, 30th August-2nd September 2021 [online]
'The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion’ (Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett)
Delusion Formation Workshop
Birmingham, July 2021 [online]
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Against a Second Factor'. Asian Journal of Philosophy, symposium on Kengo Miyazono's Delusions and Beliefs.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Rush, Michael forthcoming: 'Unbiased Awarding of Art Prizes? It's Hard to Judge'. British Journal of Aesthetics.
Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: ‘The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion’. In Henne, Paul and Murray, Sam (eds.) Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Believing Badly Ain't So Bad'. Philosophical Psychology. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2077717. [Review essay on Neil Levy's Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People.]
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2022: 'Debunking Doxastic Transparency'. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 5–24.
Noordhof, Paul 2021: ‘Explaining Impossible and Possible Imaginings of Pain’. Revista de Filosofía y Psicología. Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 173–82.
Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2021: 'The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusions'. Synthese. Vol. 199, pp. 10277-10309
In September 2021, the Imperfect Cognitions blog dedicated a week to the Project and published five posts:
1. Interview with Ema about the Project
2. Summary of Paul and Ema’s paper ‘The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusion’
3. Harriet Stuart's write up of our first Project Workshop
4. Summary of Paul’s paper ‘Radden on Imagining Pain and Delusional Affections’
5. Harriet Stuart's interview with Carolina Flores
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: 'Delusion and Function'
Ichino, Anna and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: ''Conspiracy Theories and Psychopathology'
Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: 'Making Sense of Delusional Experience'
Noordhof, Paul and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: Deluded by Experience
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: 'Evolutionary Pressures on Belief Capacities' (to appear in Lombrozo and Van Leeuwen's Oxford Handbook on the Cognitive Science of Belief)
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema: 'In Defence of Ontic Thinness for Belief' (to appear in Schwitzgebel and Jong's What Is Belief?)
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed): Belief, Imagination, and Delusion (under contract with OUP)
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema (ed): The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion (under contract with Routledge)
Previous relevant work
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: ‘We Are Like American Robins'. In Stapleford, Scott and McCain, Kevin (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: 'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 679–704.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2020: 'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 177, pp. 1213–1227.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Biased by Our Imaginings'. Mind and Language. Vol. 34, pp. 627–47.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance?' Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02414-3
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence from Experience'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 920–47.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?' Synthese. Vol. 195, no. 8, pp. 3453–76.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'The Epistemic Innocence of Clinical Memory Distortions'. Mind and Language. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 263–79.
Noordhof, Paul 2018: 'Imaginative Content', Fabian Dorsch and Fiona Macpherson (eds), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 96-129.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) 2017: Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Aims and Exclusivity'. European Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 721–31.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity’. Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 94–110.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2017: 'Another Defence of Owens's Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims'. Logos and Episteme. Vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 147–53.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence'. Consciousness and Cognition. Vol. 33, pp. 548–60.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2013: ‘A Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 163, no. 2, pp. 453–57.
Noordhof, Paul 2009: ‘The Essential Instability of Self-Deception’, Social Theory and Practice, 2009, 35, no. 1, pp. 45-71.
Noordhof, Paul 2003: 'Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, no. 1, July 2003, pp. 75-100.
Noordhof, Paul 2002: 'Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences', Mind and Language, 17, no. 4, September 2002, pp. 426-455.
Noordhof, Paul 2001: 'Believe What You Want', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2001, 101, no. 3, pp. 247-265.