Publications
BOOKS
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) 2017: Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
Reviews
- Nils-Hennes Stear for NDPR ('All considered, this is an excellently edited collection of consistently high-quality papers that should interest epistemologists, fiction theorists, and philosophers of art and literature.')
- Kengo Miyazono for British Journal of Aesthetics ('Each chapter contains original and insightful ideas. This volume is an essential item for anyone interested in the philosophical issues concerning art and cognition.')
ARTICLES
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 'Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance?' Synthese.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: 'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 679–704.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2020: 'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 177, pp. 1213–1227.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Biased by Our Imaginings'. Mind and Language. Vol. 34, pp. 627–47.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence from Experience'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 920–47.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?' Synthese. Vol. 195, no. 8, pp. 3453–76.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'The Epistemic Innocence of Clinical Memory Distortions'. Mind and Language. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 263–79.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Aims and Exclusivity'. European Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 721–31.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity’. Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 94–110.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2017: 'Another Defence of Owens's Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims'. Logos and Episteme. Vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 147–53.
Stoneham, Tom, and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Another Failed Refutation of Scepticism'. Teorema. Vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 19–30.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Malfunction Defended’. Synthese. Vol. 194, no. 7, pp. 2501–22.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence'. Consciousness and Cognition. Vol. 33, pp. 548–60.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2013: ‘A Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 163, no. 2, pp. 453–57.
McGregor, Rafe and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2012: ‘Better No Longer to Be: The Harm of Continued Existence’. South African Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 55–68.
CHAPTERS
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: ‘We Are Like American Robins'. In Stapleford, Scott and McCain, Kevin (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Bortolotti, Lisa, Antrobus, Magdalena, and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: ‘The Epistemic Innocence of Optimistically Biased Beliefs?’ In Balcerak Jackson, Brendan and Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena (eds.) Reasoning. Oxford University Press, pp. 232–47.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Bortolotti, Lisa 2017. 'Fictional Persuasion, Transparency, and the Aim of Belief'. In Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press, pp. 153–73.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bortolotti, Lisa, Broome, Matthew and Mameli, Matteo 2017: ‘Moral and Legal Implications of the Continuity between Delusional and Non-delusional Beliefs’. In Keil, Geert (ed.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, pp. 191–210.
Bortolotti, Lisa, Gunn, Rachel, and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2016: ‘What Makes a Belief Delusional?’ In Mac Carthy, Ita, Sellevold, Kirsti, and Smith, Olivia (eds.) Cognitive Confusions. Legenda, pp. 37–51.
BOOK REVIEWS & COMMENTARIES
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Review of David Benatar The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life's Biggest Questions'. American Journal of Bioethics. Vol. 18, no. 7, pp. W4–W5.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: ‘Belief-like Biases and Concept Centrality'. Symposium on Guillermo Del Pinal and Shannon Spaulding’s 'Conceptual Centrality and Implicit Bias'. The Brains Blog.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Transparency Defended'. Symposium on Miriam McCormick's Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief. Syndicate Philosophy.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘The Role of Emotions and Values in Competence’. Journal of Medical Ethics. Vol. 43, pp. 379–80.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Review of The Aim of Belief by Timothy Chan (ed.)'. Mind. Vol. 124, no. 496, pp. 1258–64.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2014: ‘Review of New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure by Nikolaj Nottelmann’. Dialectica. Vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 141–6.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2012: ‘Changing Approaches to Blindsight: Relevant, but not Decisive: Reply to Foley’. Philosophical Writings; Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual British Postgraduate Philosophy Conference. pp. 56–60.
