Project Outputs
Work in progress
Noordhof and Sullivan-Bissett: 'The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusion'
Noordhof and Sullivan-Bissett: 'Making Sense of Delusional Experience'
Noordhof and Sullivan-Bissett: 'The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion: Lessons from Paranormal Believers and Self Deceivers'
Previous relevant work
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: ‘We Are Like American Robins'. In Stapleford, Scott and McCain, Kevin (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: 'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 679–704.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2020: 'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 177, pp. 1213–1227.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Biased by Our Imaginings'. Mind and Language. Vol. 34, pp. 627–47.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance?' Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02414-3
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence from Experience'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 920–47.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?' Synthese. Vol. 195, no. 8, pp. 3453–76.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'The Epistemic Innocence of Clinical Memory Distortions'. Mind and Language. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 263–79.
Noordhof, Paul 2018: 'Imaginative Content', Fabian Dorsch and Fiona Macpherson (eds), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 96-129.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) 2017: Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Aims and Exclusivity'. European Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 721–31.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity’. Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 94–110.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2017: 'Another Defence of Owens's Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims'. Logos and Episteme. Vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 147–53.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence'. Consciousness and Cognition. Vol. 33, pp. 548–60.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2013: ‘A Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 163, no. 2, pp. 453–57.
Noordhof, Paul 2009: ‘The Essential Instability of Self-Deception’, Social Theory and Practice, 2009, 35, no. 1, pp. 45-71.
Noordhof, Paul 2003: 'Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, no. 1, July 2003, pp. 75-100.
Noordhof, Paul 2002: 'Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences', Mind and Language, 17, no. 4, September 2002, pp. 426-455.
Noordhof, Paul 2001: 'Believe What You Want', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2001, 101, no. 3, pp. 247-265.
Work in progress
Noordhof and Sullivan-Bissett: 'The Clinical Significance of Anomalous Experience in the Explanation of Monothematic Delusion'
Noordhof and Sullivan-Bissett: 'Making Sense of Delusional Experience'
Noordhof and Sullivan-Bissett: 'The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion: Lessons from Paranormal Believers and Self Deceivers'
Previous relevant work
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: ‘We Are Like American Robins'. In Stapleford, Scott and McCain, Kevin (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2020: 'Unimpaired Abduction to Alien Abduction: Lessons on Delusion Formation'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 679–704.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2020: 'The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief'. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 177, pp. 1213–1227.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Biased by Our Imaginings'. Mind and Language. Vol. 34, pp. 627–47.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2019: 'Is Choice Blindness a Case of Self-Ignorance?' Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02414-3
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence from Experience'. Philosophical Psychology. Vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 920–47.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?' Synthese. Vol. 195, no. 8, pp. 3453–76.
Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2018: 'The Epistemic Innocence of Clinical Memory Distortions'. Mind and Language. Vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 263–79.
Noordhof, Paul 2018: 'Imaginative Content', Fabian Dorsch and Fiona Macpherson (eds), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 96-129.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema, Bradley, Helen, and Noordhof, Paul (eds.) 2017: Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: 'Aims and Exclusivity'. European Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 721–31.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2017: ‘Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity’. Philosophical Explorations. Vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 94–110.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2017: 'Another Defence of Owens's Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims'. Logos and Episteme. Vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 147–53.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema 2015: 'Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence'. Consciousness and Cognition. Vol. 33, pp. 548–60.
Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2013: ‘A Defence of Owens’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 163, no. 2, pp. 453–57.
Noordhof, Paul 2009: ‘The Essential Instability of Self-Deception’, Social Theory and Practice, 2009, 35, no. 1, pp. 45-71.
Noordhof, Paul 2003: 'Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, no. 1, July 2003, pp. 75-100.
Noordhof, Paul 2002: 'Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences', Mind and Language, 17, no. 4, September 2002, pp. 426-455.
Noordhof, Paul 2001: 'Believe What You Want', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2001, 101, no. 3, pp. 247-265.
